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On 20 April 2010, the drilling rig Deepwater Horizonexploded over the Macondo Prospect oil field and
subsequently sank, initiating the release of huge amounts
of petroleum and natural gas into the Gulf of Mexico.
Almost 3 months later, on 15 July 2010, the corporation
responsible for the accident reported that the leak had
been stopped by placing a cap on the wellhead.
n Dimensions of the problem
Considerable uncertainty remains regarding the actual
oil-flow rate and the total amount of oil spilled because
of the difficulty of installing accurate measurement
devices at the depth at which the well was situated
(~1500 m). The best estimate of the spill rate was 60
thousand barrels (~2.5 million gallons) of crude oil per
day, which represents a total of about 5.2 million bar-
rels (~216 million gallons) during the 86 days that the
well was leaking (Kerr 2010). This was the second
largest oceanic oil spill in history, topped only by the
combined output of the Arabian Gulf spills that
occurred in 1991 (~336 million gallons; NOAA 2010).
By comparison, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in
1989, which generated considerable national and inter-
national attention, was much smaller (10.8 million gal-
lons; NOAA 2010).
Because the Deepwater Horizon spill originated deep
underwater, its effects were “three-dimensional”, contam-
inating a large volume of the ocean water column, mil-
lions of hectares of the ocean surface, and probably large
areas of the seafloor as well. Residual oil plumes and tar
balls are still impacting more than 100 km of the south-
ern US coastline, and a full cleanup is expected to take
years. Estimates vary considerably regarding how much of
the oil was removed by the initial attempts at skimming
and burning. It has been estimated that perhaps 23% of
the oil released from the well was dissolved or evaporated,
approximately 13% was dispersed naturally and, as a
result of the widespread application of the chemical dis-
persant COREXIT® 9500, around 16% remains as
microscopic droplets suspended in Gulf waters (Lehr et al.
2010). The residual amount (~38%) was thought to have
been either washed ashore or buried in seafloor sedi-
ments. These estimates should be considered with
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In a nutshell:
• The Deepwater Horizon oil spill seriously impacted coastal
ecosystems 
• Sand berms were built, inlets were restricted or blocked, and
freshwater was diverted from upstream to protect coastal
ecosystems from oil exposure
• These projects are likely to compound rather than limit ecolog-
ical damage 
• Financial and other resources would be better used by following
established, long-term restoration plans
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caution, however, because accurate measure-
ments were difficult to make. 
n Ecosystems at risk
Many ecosystems – including deep-sea ben-
thic environments, the pelagic ocean,
beaches and dunes, estuaries, and tidal
brackish and freshwater wetlands – and
numerous species were, and remain, at risk
of long-term detrimental effects as a result
of the oil spill. These ecosystems provide
valuable ecosystem services to society,
including fisheries, recreation, habitat refu-
gia, water purification, climate regulation,
carbon sequestration, hurricane protection,
and nutrient cycling (Batker et al. 2010). 
The movement of surface waters is unpre-
dictable beyond a few days; ocean currents
in the Gulf of Mexico are highly variable
and are dominated by the presence of an
intense eddy field in the open Gulf, sea-
sonal changes in continental shelf currents, tides,
winds, hurricanes, and waves. The lingering effects of
the oil spill and oil-dispersant mixtures residing in the
ocean are currently unknown and subject to intensive
research. However, the risk of damage to neighboring
states and other countries is by no means over. The
potential impacts on coastal communities and the
geopolitical consequences of the spill could be exten-
sive; more than 15 million people from three nations
(11 states in the US and Mexico, combined, plus Cuba)
live in the coastal areas bordering the Gulf of Mexico.
Protection of these coastal ecosystems is therefore an
international necessity. In particular, the marshes on
the Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi coasts
are in special need of attention because their proximity
to the oil well increased their exposure and because
large and economically important fisheries are located
in these ecosystems.
n Analysis of oil-spill mitigation efforts 
The Gulf Coast Restoration Plan, pledged by President
Obama on 16 June 2010 and subsequently expanded
(The White House 2010), was aimed at mitigating the
ecological, economic, and social damage due to the oil-
spill’s impacts, as well as recovering the thousands of
square kilometers of wetlands that have vanished over
the past century due to poor watershed management,
stream diversion, levee construction, hydrological alter-
ation, and diminished sediment supply (Day et al. 2007).
However, the details of how, or even if, this restoration is
to be carried out are incomplete, and it is unclear how
this effort relates to the long-term restoration plan
already in place for Louisiana (ie the Coastal Protection
and Restoration Authority’s master plan; CPRA 2010).
On 11 May 2010, in direct response to threats to
coastal ecosystems, the State of Louisiana requested
emergency authorization from the US Army Corps of
Engineers to perform spill mitigation work on all barrier
islands, from Grand Isle and areas west, and from Grand
Terre Island eastward to Sandy Point, as well as around
the Chandeleur Islands. This request had no overt links
to the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority’s
master plan, nor was it connected with President
Obama’s Gulf Coast Restoration Plan. Furthermore, the
request was made without consulting the regional scien-
tific community. Its stated purpose was to enhance the
capability of the barrier islands to reduce the amount of
oil reaching coastal marshes. The proposal included the
following actions: (1) building a barrier sand berm on the
seaward side of existing barrier islands, and (2) closing
some inlets between barrier islands and reducing the cross
section of some inlets by partially filling them with large
rocks (Lavoie et al. 2010). 
The premise was essentially twofold: (1) sand berms
can function as a geomorphic obstruction to, and an eco-
logical filter for, oil spills, thereby protecting coastal
marsh and estuarine ecosystems; and (2) spill cleanup is
easier on sandy (dredged) substrate than in marshes and
wetlands. In spite of intense controversy surrounding this
project, it was partially authorized on 27 May 2010
(Deepwater Horizon Response 2010). The US Army
Corps of Engineers approved a permit for 46 miles of sand
berms to be constructed on the Chandeleur Islands (on
the eastern side of the Mississippi River’s outlet to the
Gulf) and from Scofield Island to Timbalier Island (on
the western side) (Figure 1; USACE 2010). As of 22
November 2010, 12.5 miles of berms had been completed
(Figure 2; USACE 2010). Subsequently, authorities from
the state and coastal counties presented a plan to use rock
Proposed berm
placement
Figure 1. Location of the proposed sand berms along the Louisiana coast.
Adapted from Lavoie et al. (2010). 
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barriers to close some inlets into Barataria Bay to prevent
oil intrusion into the estuary. This permit request was
denied (USACE 2010). 
A similar situation occurred on Dauphin Island,
Alabama, where berms were constructed in May 2010.
During Hurricane Katrina, a large gap was created as the
island was cut in half by the storm surge (Feagin and
Williams 2008) and the “Katrina Cut” project was subse-
quently initiated to block a major inlet (Figure 3). The aim
of the approximately $13 million Katrina Cut project was
to fill and armor the gap with a combination of geo-textile
tubes and riprap (a barrier consisting of large rocks or
lumps of concrete). Initially, the plan was to re-open the
inlet once the oil risk abated, although this has since
changed; the intention now is to leave the barrier in place.
Freshwater diversions were also used in an effort to mit-
igate the impacts of the spilled oil. In late April 2010, the
State of Louisiana opened floodgates into the Barataria
Bay and Breton Sound basins, the premise being that by
increasing the quantity of water flowing down the basins,
oil could be prevented from approaching coastal marshes
and penetrating inland. The initiated flow rate was much
greater than that recommended in long-term planning
documents describing the purpose of these diversion
structures, which was to maintain salinities appropriate
for fish and oyster production and to allow sedimentation
into submerging wetlands (CPRA 2010).
Decisions to construct sand berms, fill inlets, or divert
freshwater as protective measures against encroaching
oil should be based on scientific knowledge and experi-
ence, and should take into account long-term restoration
and management plans. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no documented examples in the peer-reviewed
literature of the effectiveness of these methods in miti-
gating oil-spill impacts on coastal ecosystems. The role
played by natural barrier islands in
reducing erosion rates of inland
coastal margins has been extensively
investigated in this region (eg Stone
and McBride 1998); however, there is
little evidence of the successful use of
constructed sand berms for oil protec-
tion in the literature (Froede 2007).
The absence of evidence to support or
refute the effectiveness of these meth-
ods in mitigating coastal ecosystem
oil impacts underscores the impor-
tance of involving the scientific com-
munity in decision making and the
integration of any coastal oil-spill
mitigation strategies into existing
coastal restoration plans. Below, we
outline scientific and technical con-
siderations that bear directly on the
Deepwater Horizon accident and the
subsequent remediation efforts.
nMitigation strategies
Sand berms
The amount of sediment needed to build the proposed sand
berms in Louisiana alone is substantial. Estimates show that
building a 2-m-high, 130-km-long barrier requires 2 million
cubic meters of sand (Bahr 2010). The Northern Gulf
region no longer features a continuous chain of islands for a
variety of reasons, including human perturbations in sedi-
ment supply, sea-level rise, subsidence, and periodic hurri-
cane damage (eg Otvos and Carter 2008). In this context,
any sedimentary modification will be relatively short-lived.
There is also the question of where the sediment for the
berms comes from. Offshore sandy sediment resources are
limited in extent and volume (Kulp et al. 2005), and the
transport of suitable sediment from farther afield (Finkl et
al. 2006) can be prohibitively expensive in terms of both
time and resources. Sediment is precious in this region and
should be used strategically (Kulp et al. 2005; Finkl et al.
2006). Moreover, when planning any large-scale dredging
operation (Figure 2), serious consideration must be given to
the potential impacts on in situ benthic organisms and
habitat, and the potential for increasing turbidity and its
effects on pelagic flora and fauna (Wilber and Clarke 2001;
Erftemeijer and Lewis 2006).
Inlet restrictions
Inlets, particularly their geographical positions, are criti-
cal to the hydrological and ecological function of bays
and estuaries. Geomorphic and ecological changes are
likely to occur in locations where sand berms or other oil-
spill mitigation operations block or restrict inlets.
Profound alterations to sediment and biological transport
Figure 2. Building sand berms (with dredged sand) along the Louisiana coast.
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routes are possible whenever local
hydrology is manipulated (Chaibi
and Sedrati 2009). The reduction of
inlet volume decreases the exchange
of water and sediments during tides
(Kraus and Militello 1999). This, in
turn, affects flow velocities, typically
resulting in scouring along bank
margins, while near-shore wave
dynamics often change as well
(Komar 1996). The closing of inlets
can modify the salinity, oxygen
level, and turbidity of back bays.
Associated ecosystems often experi-
ence large fish kills or other radical
shifts toward new ecological states,
as physical and chemical parameters
adjust to a decrease in mixing
throughout the water column
(Goodwin 1996). If inlet restriction
is absolutely necessary, it should aim
to minimize the impacts on local
hydrology and ecosystem function.
Long-term barrier dynamics 
Barrier islands, inlets, and sand resources are dynamic fea-
tures of regressing coastlines. They change shape and
move in response to ocean currents, winds, hurricanes,
and storm surges (Grasso et al. 2009). All barrier islands
are subject to, and impacted by, sand supply and mean sea
level, but the details of how they form differ. Barrier
islands along the southeastern US coastline are formed by
natural wave, tidal, and aeolian processes. In contrast, the
barrier islands of the Mississippi Delta were formed by the
deposition of silt-laden sands arriving from upstream, and
have a relatively short life cycle as compared with coastal
barrier islands elsewhere. Additionally, the other Gulf
barrier islands differ from those in North Carolina, for
example, by being more sand starved and by being
exposed to higher rates of relative sea-level rise due to
high local subsidence rates.
Construction of sand berms and inlet restrictions
should be based on knowledge of consolidation loading to
the underlying sediment (eg compaction of sediments rel-
ative to sea level), overwash processes, and other features
associated with long-term barrier island migration
(Rosati and Stone 2009) or broad-spatial-scale littoral
processes (Kraus and Militello 1999). In this sense, berms
will be easily eroded, overtopped, and assimilated into
the littoral budget of the islands. For example, Sallenger
et al. (2009) observed exceptionally large geomorphic
changes in the Chandeleur Islands as a result of several
storms. In the broader context of the loss of these islands,
relatively small waves from Hurricane Alex (2010)
breached and eroded 2-m-high berms in southwest
Louisiana and the Chandeleur Islands. Although provi-
sion of sand to the adjacent islands could be a positive
outcome of rapid erosion, this would still represent a rela-
tively expensive, non-strategic use of sediment resources. 
In contrast, wherever inlets are blocked or restricted,
the sedimentary and biological responses will be long-
lasting and far-reaching. Inlet restriction projects, while
initially driven by a sense of urgency to prevent oil from
reaching estuaries, may turn out to have the most detri-
mental effects on estuarine ecosystems. The current
trends in coastal science and engineering research lead in
the opposite direction, toward a measured and strategic
use of human engineering in the context of overwhelm-
ingly large, powerful, and long-term natural processes
(Feagin et al. 2010). 
Freshwater diversions
Earlier studies that tested the effectiveness of river diver-
sions in removing nutrients and organic loads draining
into adjacent streams and rivers concluded that such
strategies are useful. Mitsch and Day (2006) found that
the use of these large freshwater diversions (maximum
discharge 150–200 m3 s–1) was sufficient to remove from
rivers and streams a substantial percentage (> 60%) of the
nitrate–nitrogen supplied to these fluvial systems by farm-
land runoff. At the same time, the diversions increased
the supply of sediments and nutrients to coastal areas,
where they are needed to rebuild eroding marshes. 
Because these studies have shown that freshwater
diversions can flush contaminants downstream and
potentially away from the coast, the State of Louisiana
opened diversion structures in the Barataria Bay and
Breton Sound basins, in an attempt to prevent oil from
Figure 3. Crews blockade the inlet with riprap at Katrina Cut on Dauphin Island,
Alabama. This view is from the uninhabited west end of the island, looking across the inlet
toward the heavily developed east end.
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flowing into coastal marshes. The general consensus
among researchers and fishermen has been that this
action devastated oyster recruitment, and is projected to
wreck the oyster harvest for approximately 3 years
(Greater New Orleans Inc Regional Economic Alliance
2010). In terms of reducing oiling, there has been no sci-
entific evidence to support or refute that the use of fresh-
water diversions was effective in the Gulf. As with any
environmental manipulation, there is a need for formal
and rigorous research to reduce uncertainties and to
ensure that the benefits are likely to be greater than
potentially negative side effects. 
n Conclusions
Coastal ecosystems are dynamic, which means there are
inherent risks for their inhabitants; hurricanes, storm
surges, tsunamis, and rainfall-induced flooding are nat-
ural hazards, some of which may increase in frequency
and/or magnitude with climate change. Continued pres-
sure to increase oil extraction from coastal zones may lead
to further stress on coastal ecosystems and recurring con-
taminant spills, resulting in large-scale and temporally
extended social and economic impacts. The coasts of the
Gulf of Mexico have been exposed to two of the five
largest oil spills in history, many minor oil spills, and
ongoing natural leaks (Jernelöv 2010). This necessitates a
carefully considered approach to any restoration efforts
for the Gulf’s ecosystems.
Sand-berm construction, inlet modification, and the use
of freshwater diversions to reduce oil exposure are high-
risk strategies with dubious short-term effectiveness and
potentially long-term negative implications. They involve
the expenditure of large amounts of finite material and fis-
cal resources. Responses to the Deepwater Horizon acci-
dent appear to have been largely politically motivated,
with little input from the regional, national, or interna-
tional scientific community. Why did this happen? Why
did risky programs, based on little or no technical or scien-
tific evidence, continue to move forward? Are we pre-
pared to deal with the lasting side effects? Did these pro-
jects make any difference to oil-spill remediation? The
answers to these questions are largely unknown.
Comprehensive coastal restoration plans, including the
CPRA (2010), have been extensively developed, and
there is broad support for them from scientists and stake-
holders. The consideration and development of these
restoration plans is in direct contrast to the poorly
planned schemes aimed at limiting the impacts of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The scientific community is
regularly portrayed as being internally conflicted on
many environmental issues and consistently calling for
more research; in this particular case, however, the exis-
tence of a comprehensive plan should have at least pro-
vided a secure platform for developing an effective, effi-
cient, and engaged approach to ecological restoration. In
this instance, the scientific community had delivered
clear, comprehensive recommendations, but these were
not adequately taken into account. 
Were there other alternatives? Another option may
have been to simply do nothing in direct response to the
spill, and instead to redouble commitment to the CPRA.
Some oil-spill damage may have been inevitable, yet the
responses to it (eg artificial sand berms) may, in the end,
cause even greater long-term harm to coastal ecosystems.
In trying to reduce harm, we may have introduced more
and longer-range impacts.
The challenges involved in designing mitigation and
restoration plans are extensive and complex, and need to
balance environmental and socioeconomic benefits.
Ultimately, to prevent future disasters like the Deepwater
Horizon spill, we need to shift the burden of risk (prior to
the approval of drilling permits) more directly to the oil
companies by improving and enforcing regulations, and
requiring adequate insurance or assurance bonds to indem-
nify the public (Costanza et al. 2010).  It is of particular con-
cern that a Mexican oil company has begun the exploration
and drilling of deep-water oil/gas wells, even though there is
no regulation of these activities and no research regarding
their safety and/or possible impacts in case of an accident.
In addition to exploring for new wells, it is time to invest in
research, development of safety procedures, accident pre-
vention, long-term monitoring, and environmental conser-
vation and restoration. We need to ensure that the shock of
the oil spill does not distract us from the development of a
viable, long-term plan for the restoration of the Gulf Coast.
Elements of such a plan are already in place and judicious
implementation needs to begin.
Finally, a year after the oil spill began, the results of
studies to assess whether these artificial modifications of
the coast actually worked, or if their impacts were worse
than the spill itself, are beginning to trickle in. It is time
to develop methods, policies, and institutions to act on
that knowledge. 
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